The Effects of Political Fragmentation on Fiscal Deficits in Turkey by Yesim Kustepeli & Gülcan Önel




THE EFFECTS OF POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION 




Dokuz Eylül University, Faculty of Business, Department of Economics, 
Kaynaklar Yerleşkesi, Buca 35160 İzmir-Turkey  




Dokuz Eylül University, Faculty of Business, Department of Economics 
Kaynaklar Yerleşkesi, Buca 35160 İzmir-Turkey  
Phone: 90-232-4535042/8212; fax : 90-232-4535062 
gulcan.onel@deu.edu.tr 
 
Key words:  budget deficits, political fragmentation, dispersion indexes 
 
Abstract:  
Recent theoretical and empirical research has considered how differences in political arrangements 
affecting national policy formation might explain variation in fiscal policies pursued (Volkerink and 
de Haan, 2001). The experience of high government deficits of developed nations in the 1980s led 
researchers to analyze the reasons for this and among other factors they have argued that political 
variables could also explain budget deficits (Sutter, 2003).  
 
This study aims to investigate the effects of the political parties for fiscal deficits in Turkey for 1976-
2004 period. Our results show that the most important variable in explaining the budget deficit to GDP 
ratio in Turkey is its lagged value. The political dispersion index variable, which measures the effect 
of the number of parties in the government in power, has proven to have a minor effect. Only the 
coalition governments with two or more parties are found to have higher budget deficit to GDP ratios. 
Ideology of the governments in power is important for the budget deficit to GDP ratio when it is 
considered with the number of parties in the government in power. In general, it can be said that 
polarization, fragmentation and ideology of the governments do not play an important role in 
explaining the budget deficit to GDP ratio.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The experience of high budget deficits of industrialized countries and the resulting 
increase in their public debt stock led researchers to investigate the underlying reasons and for 
driving forces for the budget deficits. One major outcome of this investigation was that 
deficits and debt could partly be explained by macroeconomic variables such as the business 
cycles. The other important part of the research argued that political variables like 
polarization between alternative governments or the institutions governing the budgetary 
process may be crucial in understanding cross-country differences in deficits and debt (Sutter, 
2003: 313).  
 
The explanation of how differences in political arrangements and institutions affecting 
national policy formation might explain variation in fiscal policies pursued is made by models 
which focus on the disagreement among agents in the decision-making process. As the 
conflicts among such agents increase, the difficulty of reducing budget deficits also increases. 
These kinds of policy conflicts become more important in countries with coalition 
governments. When a single party is in the power of government, costs might be easily 
shifted to outsiders. Multi-party governments will certainly also try to do the same thing, but 
policies that distribute adjustment cost equally and neutrally among governing parties will be 
more difficult to devise. When the number of parties in a coalition government increases, i.e. 
when the coalition government becomes more fragmented and polarized, it is harder to come 
with neutral adjustment plans. In addition, there will be uncertainty between the coalition 
parties about the toleration of the rising deficits and the resulting debt and about the timing of 
the stabilization plans, which might have in distributional implications that they dislike. All of 
these uncertainties lead polarized and fragmented governments to delay stabilization longer 
than would unified governments (Franseze, 2000) 
 
The model of conflict presented above can also be explained by the help of the game 
theory, which shows that cooperation is more difficult when the number of players is large 
(Tutar and Tansel, 2000). Applying this to coalition governments means that they will find it 
difficult to decrease and hopefully close budget deficits after adverse shocks, since parties in 
the coalition will reject spending cuts or tax increases that are against the interests of their 
respective constituencies (de Haan and Sturm, 1997).  
 
The effects of fragmentation and polarization of governments on budget deficits have 
been analyzed by researchers mostly by creating a political power dispersion index. The 
studies by Roubini and Sachs (1989a, b) constitute a touchstone on this issue. Their model of 
political and economic determinants of budget deficits identifies the type of government in 
power (majority or minority) by the index of political power dispersion. Their results in a 
sample of 14 OECD countries indicate that fiscal debt increases as the number of parties in a 
coalition government increases. Roubini and Sachs (1989b) also argue that coalition 
governments will be biased towards higher levels of government spending relative to majority 
party governments. The reason for this is that the parties in government will make logrolling 
agreements so as to ensure higher outlays benefiting their individual constituencies.   
 
The studies by Roubini and Sachs have been criticized by Edin and Ohlsson (1991), in 
the sense that the political dispersion index of Roubini and Sachs (1989a, b) captures the 
effects of minority governments rather than majority coalition governments. In the same line, 
de Haan and Sturm (1994) could not find support for neither the Roubini and Sachs (1989) 
hypothesis nor the position expressed by Edin and Ohlsson (1991) for the EU member   4
countries. de Haan and Sturm (1997), in a later paper, examine whether cross-country 
differences in debt-accumulation and level of government spending can be explained using    
the “corrected” power dispersion index of Roubini and Sachs (1989) for 21 OECD countries 
for 1982-1992 period. However, their findings point that the growth of government debt and 
government spending are not related to the political power dispersion index.  
 
Volkerink and de Haan (2001) extend previous literature on the effects of fragmented 
government on fiscal policy outcomes in various directions using a panel data of 22 OECD 
countries over 1971-1996 period. Their focus is on the central government instead of general 
government contrary to all of previous studies on this issue. They investigate not only the 
effect of fragmentation of government but also government’s position vis-à-vis parliament. 
They find that political fragmentation does not affect government’s budget deficit.  
 
Huber, Kocher and Sutter (2003) use the Banzhaf index of voting power, respectively 
the standard deviation of Banzhaf indices of coalition parties to measure the government 
strength and power dispersion. The results of the empirical analysis using this index indicates 
that a higher dispersion of voting power of government coalition members leads to less debt 
accumulation in OECD countries from 1970 to 1990. Equally strong coalition partners are 
biased towards blocking any cooperative outcome by using their veto power. Coalition 
governments composed of parties, which differ considerably in their voting power, are better 
in achieving a successful stabilization of their debt level. All of this evidence supports the 
models insisting on the importance of the distribution of power within coalition governments.  
 
Political economists have also argued that left-wing parties and right-wing parties 
differ in their fiscal policy priorities. Specifically, left governments favor larger public 
economies, greater redistribution, and more Keynesian expansion and so they are expected to 
run greater deficits than rightist governments (Franseze, 2000). Among others, Midtbo (1999) 
uses a pooled vector AR model and finds that public sector growth remains higher during left-
wing rule. 
 
Another group of research on this issue is the political business cycle models, which in 
addition to other political variables take the effects of elections into account. According to 
these, politicians are inclined to run budget deficits before the elections and follow 
contractionary budget policies after the elections. The contraction after the elections is usually 
postponed and the expected austerity almost never happens. Tutar and Tansel (2000) examine 
the effects of both the coalition governments and the elections on budget deficits in Turkey 
for 1960-1996. They argue that these two effects should be tested together because election 
dates are as important as the periods of coalition whose effects are also political issues. They 
find that annual deficits increase when both the number of fiscal authorities and the number of 
coalition parties increase, while quarterly budget deficits to GNP is unaffected by the 
elections and the power dispersion index and monthly deficits increase by elections.  
 
This study aims to investigate the importance of properties of political parties for 
fiscal deficits in Turkey. Specifically, political fragmentation will be proxied by constructing 
two political dispersion indexes, one which takes single and coalition parties including the 
number of parties in the coalition into consideration, the other indicating whether the party or 
parties in power are leftists or rightist. With the help of these indexes, the effects of 
fragmentation and ideology on budget deficits will be tested.   
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In the rest of the paper, the second section describes the econometric model used and 
the data and, the third section presents the results while conclusion and policy implications 
are given in the final and fourth section.  
 
2. DATA AND THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL  
In order to test the effects of political fragmentation and political ideology on the 
budget deficits, this paper will use the standard model used in the literature. This standard 
model has its roots from Roubini and Sachs (1989a) and is consistent with optimization 
approaches to budget deficits and also with the traditional Keynesian models of fiscal deficits 
(de Haan and Sturm: 1997: 743).  
 
The econometric model to be estimated in this paper can be written as follows:  
 
ε IDE α COL α DRB α GROWTH α DEFL α α DEF
3 2 1 0 + + + + + + =
5 4          (1) 
 
where DEF is the budget deficit to GDP ratio, DEFL the lagged budget deficit to GDP ratio, 
GROWTH the rate of GDP growth, DRB is the change in debt-servicing costs, COL is the 
political dispersion index which measures the majority or coalition parties, and finally, IDE is 
the political dispersion index which measures the ideology of the parties in power.  
 
DRB variable is calculated as follows:  
  
1 . ) ( − − − = t Y B n p i d DRB                               (2) 
 
where  i= interest payments on government debt to debt ratio, p= inflation rate, n= growth rate 
B. Yt-1 = lagged debt to GDP ratio 
 
The first political dispersion index variable COL ranges from 0 to 3 and described as;
1 
 
0  one party majority governments; 
1  the coalition governments with two or three parties;  
2  the coalition governments with four or more parties; 
3 minority  governments.   
 
The other political dispersion variable IDE takes the values 0, 1 or 2; 0 if it is a neutral 
government
2, 1 if it is a rightist party and 2 if it is a leftist party. 
 
However, as Edin and Ohlson (1991) have pointed out, the construction of COL 
places a very restrictive form on its possible effects. Therefore, we also estimated equation 1 
with dummy variables for each “political class” and for each “ideology class” as suggested by 





                                                 
1 As the periods in which governments were in power are in disorder, the data for governments in power are 
formed as follows: For every year, the government which has been in power for the longest period in  12 months 
has been considered as the government in power for that year.    
2 Here, the ideaology dummy is constructed for 3 classes because after 1980, the ideology of the military 
government who has stayed in power for 3 years is considered as “neutral”.    6
COL1  = 1 if coalition government with two or three parties 
  = 0 if otherwise  
COL2  = 1 if coalition governments with four or more parties 
  = 0 if otherwise 
COL3  = 1 if minority governments 
  = 0 if otherwise 
 
And, the descriptions of the IDE dummies are; 
 
IDE1  = 1 if it’s a rightist party 
  = 0 if otherwise 
IDE2  = 1 if it’s a leftists party 
  = 0 if otherwise 
 
Table 1 reports the constructed political dispersion indexes of Turkey for the period of 
1976-2004.  
 
Table 1. COL and IDE Indexes for Turkey (1976-2004)  
Year  Government  Majority, Minority or Coalition 
Ideology of the major 
party  COL IDE 
1976  4. Demirel  coalition with 4 parties  rightist  2  1 
1977  4. Demirel  coalition with 4 parties  rightist  2  1 
1978  3. Ecevit  one party majority  leftist  0  2 
1979  3. Ecevit  one party majority  leftist  0  2 
1980  6. Demirel  one party minority  rightist  3  1 
1981 Ulusu  military  -  3  0 
1982 Ulusu  military  - 3  0 
1983 Ulusu  military  - 3  0 
1984  1. Özal  one party majority  rightist  0  1 
1985  1. Özal  one party majority  rightist  0  1 
1986  1. Özal  one party majority  rightist  0  1 
1987  1. Özal  one party majority  rightist  0  1 
1988  2. Özal  one party majority  rightist  0  1 
1989  2. Özal  one party majority  rightist  0  1 
1990  Akbulut  one party majority  rightist  0  1 
1991  Akbulut  one party majority  rightist  0  1 
1992  7. Demirel  coalition with 2 parties  rightist  1  1 
1993  7. Demirel  coalition with 2 parties  rightist  1  1 
1994  1. Çiller  coalition with 2 parties  rightist  1  1 
1995  1. Çiller  coalition with 2 parties  rightist  1  1 
1996  Erbakan  coalition with 2 parties  rightist  1  1 
1997 3.  Yılmaz  coalition with 4 parties, minority  rightist  3  1 
1998 3.  Yılmaz  coalition with 4 parties, minority  rightist  3  1 
1999  5. Ecevit  coalition with 2 parties  leftist  1  2 
2000  5. Ecevit  coalition with 2 parties  leftist  1  2 
2001  5. Ecevit  coalition with 2 parties  leftist  1  2 
2002  5. Ecevit  coalition with 2 parties  leftist  1  2 
2003 Erdoğan  one party majority  rightist  0  1 
2004 Erdoğan  one party majority  rightist  0  1 
 
The data for the COL and IDE index variables are constructed by the data from the 
Election Publications of State Statistical Institute of Turkey. The data on all of the other   7
variables are obtained from either the State Statistical Institute or State Planning Organization 
of Turkey. Our data is annual and covers the period 1976-2004.  The government budget 
deficits (DEF), debt servicing costs (DRB) and growth rates (GROWTH) are plotted in Figure 
1 below.  
 
3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
In order to test the effect of political fragmentation on government budget deficits, 
many versions of the empirical model given in equation (1) are estimated. The best versions 
in terms of significance are given in Table 2. It can be seen that Table 2 presents nine models, 
where DEFL, GROWTH, and DRB exist in all models, but the political dispersion index 
variables, COL and IDE, have been used interchangeably.  
 
In all models, DEFL is clearly seen to be significant with a positive coefficient. The 
coefficient reaches the highest value of 0.85 when none or only one of the political dispersion 
indexes is used in the equation. As the COL and IDE dummies are added, the coefficient of 
DEFL remains statistically significant but falls to 0.69 at the least.  This means that the lagged 
budget deficit to GDP ratio has a very important place in explaining the current budget 
deficits to GDP ratio.  
 
The rate of GDP growth (GROWTH) is the second variable used in the empirical 
model. It proves to affect the budget deficit to GDP ratio negatively and significantly in the 
first four regressions. In these regressions, the models contain either COL or COL1, COL2 
and COL3 or IDE, in addition to DEFL and DRB.  In the other models, GROWTH looses its 
significance and the value of the coefficient also falls from -0.21 to -0.11. It can be said that 
an increase in the rate of GDP growth decreases the budget deficit/GDP ratio but this effect 
lessens when the political dispersion indexes are also used in the equation.  
 
As for the debt–servicing costs (DRB), the variable is barely significant in most of the 
models and the size of the coefficient is small, around -0.06. An increase in debt servicing 
costs can be said to have a negative effect on the budget deficit to GDP ratio, although this 
effect does not have a strong statistical significance.    
 
All of the political dispersion index dummy variables, COL, COL1, COL2, COL3, 
IDE, IDE1, IDE2 and IDE3, are found to have positive effects on the budget deficit/GDP 
ratio. However, they are very rarely statistically significant. 
 
The first political dispersion index COL has a very small effect (0.05) on DEF when it 
is the only political dispersion variable used in the model. Its effect increases to 0.49 and 0.53 
when IDE and; IDE1 and IDE2 are also in the equation respectively (models 6 and 8). 
However, none of these are statistically significant. Among COL1, COL2 and COL3, only the 
positive effect of COL1 is statistically significant in all models where it is used. This means 
that governments in power which are coalitions with two or three parties have higher budget 
deficit to GDP ratios. Minority governments and coalition government with four or more 
parties do not seem to have a significant effect on budget deficit to GDP ratio.  
 
             The other political dispersion index dummy IDE measures the effect of the ideology 
of the government in power on the budget deficits. We see that IDE is significant only when it 
is used with COL in the equation (model 6). Ideology matters when it is considered with the 
number of parties in the government in power. IDE1, which measures the effect of parties on 
budget deficits is found to have a positive effect but it is not significant. On the other hand,   8
IDE2, which measures the effect of leftist parties on budget deficits, is statistically significant 
in regression 8 when COL and IDE1 are also in the equation. Its positive effect is quite large 
as 4.18.  
 
4. CONCLUSION  
  One of the most important research questions for economic analysis is the reason for 
high government budget deficits in many countries, including developed and developing ones. 
An important part of research on this issue has focused on the possible effects of political and 
ideological structure of the governments in power to budget deficits (Franseze, 2000).  
 
  It has been argued by many researchers that differences in political arrangements and 
institutions may have crucial effects on the decision-making process of the budget deficits. 
For example, in a single party government, it may be easier to shift to costs to outsiders, 
whereas in multi-party governments, policies that distribute adjustment costs equally and 
neutrally among governing parties may be more difficult to come up with. In summary as the 
number of parties in coalition government increases, which means an increase in 
fragmentation and polarization, it is probably harder to come with neutral adjustment plans. In 
addition, the ideology of the government in power is proposed to have a role in explaining the 
budget deficits in a country (Midtbo, 1999). Leftist governments are expected to run greater 
deficits than rightist governments (Franseze, 2000).  
 
In this study, we aim to investigate the effects of the political parties for fiscal deficits 
in Turkey for 1976-2004 period, in two ways. First of all, we analyze the effect of 
fragmentation and polarization by taking account the number of parties in the government in 
power into account by constructing a political dispersion index dummy variable (COL). 
Secondly, the effect of the ideology of the government in power on the budget deficits is 
considered by a different index dummy variable (IDE).  
 
  Our results show that the most important variable in explaining the budget deficit to 
GDP ratio in Turkey is its lagged value. The rate of growth in GDP and debt servicing follow 
this variable in importance in explaining the budget deficit to GDP ratio in Turkey.  
 
The political dispersion index variable COL which measures the effect of the number 
of parties in the government in power has proven to have a minor effect. Only the coalition 
governments with two or more parties are found to have higher budget deficit to GDP ratios. 
Ideology of the governments in power is important for the budget deficit to GDP ratio when it 
is considered with the number of parties in the government in power. Leftist parties have a 
significant and positive effect on budget deficits. In general, it can be said that polarization, 
fragmentation and ideology of the governments do not play an important role in explaining 
the budget deficit to GDP ratio in Turkey.  
 
 
   9 
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Table 2. Estimation results of Equation 1. 
 Constant DEFL  GROWTH DRB  COL  COL1  COL2 COL3  IDE  IDE1  IDE2  Adj  R
2
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Note: t-statistics are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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